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What amount of external resources would be required to reverse
recent investment trends and bring about modest growth in per
capita incomes? Between $18 and $20 billion of net new dis-
bursements annually.  But consider the alternatives....
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Debt  and International  Finance
Under base scenario assumptions, the authors  Others will be unable - even under the
estimate that the Baker 17 countries  will require  most stringent conditions and policies - to
about $18 to $20 billion of net new disburse-  grow out of their present difficulties without
ments annually to reverse recent investment  some reduction in the stock or servicing of their
trends and bring about modest growth in per  debt.
capita incomes.
The lumping together of good and bad
The most significant shortfall is in commer-  debtors is repulsing efforts of countries that
cial bank lending.  Without an adequate burden-  should have access to voluntai,  lending.  The
sharing arrangement, i: is unlikely that official  main actors should begin by abandoning the
creditors - particularly the multilateral institu-  concept of a homogeneous group of 15 or 17
tions - would be prepared to assume a dispro-  highly indebted countries (HICs). The contagion
portionately large exposure risk in these coun-  effect should not deter the creditors from differ-
tries.  entiating between countries on the same conti-
nent that have managed their economies well
Husain and Mitra conclude that with sound  and are close to creditworthiness from those
adjustment policies in the debtor countries, a  whose economic policies and management ar-
combination of concerted new Iending, debt  of questionable quality.
reduction, reflows of flight capital, and intermit-
tant accumulation of interest arrears will be the  The next logical step is to develop a coop-
principal means of financing.  erative framework that channels money through
equitable burden sharing and promotes credit
Some countries - such as Mexico, Vene-  enhancemcnt, debt reduction, and other innova-
zuela, Nigeria, and Ecuador - need extemal  tive financing techniques in support of growth-
financing to offset their worsening terms of  oriented adjustment programs.
trade. Others need it to restore productive
investment to reasonable levels.  The altemative is continued stagnation in the
highly indebted countries - which could mean
At least some countries should be able to  political and social unrest, a greater reluctance to
work their way out of the debt crisis, as their  maintain orderly debtor-creditor relationships,
needs are feasible, so commercial bank creditors  and a disruption of debt servicing even in
wili probably respond favorably.  Others will  countries that have carried out their obligations
have to balance the finance from official and  unfailingly.
private creditors.
This paper, prepared for the conference "Dealing with the Debt Crisis," is a product
of the Debt and International Finance Division, Intcrnational  Economics Department
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1989-95  fall considerably  short  of the requirements  if  a steady  rate of growth
is to be achieved.  The most significant  shortfall  is in commercial  bank
lending.  Without adequate  burden  sharing,  it is unlikely  that  official
creditors, particularly  the  multilateral  institutions,  will assume a
disproportionately  large  exposure in  these  countries.  With sound  adjustment
policies in the debtor  countries,  a combination  of concerted  lending,  debt
reduction,  reflows of flight  capital,  and some intermittant  accumulation  of
interest  arrears  will be the principal  means cf financing.
Some countries--such  as Mexico,  Venezuela,  Nigeria,  and Ecuador--need
external finance to offset  their  worsening  terms  of trade;  others  need it to
restore productive  investment  at reasonable  levels.  At least some  countries
should  be able to work their  way out of the  debt crisis--because  their
resource  requirements  are feasible  and commercial  bank creditors  will probably
respond favorably.  Others  will have to balance  the finance  from official  and
private creditors.  Others still  will be unable,  even under the most stringent
conditions  and most sensible  policies,  to grow out of their  difficulties
without some reduction  in the stock  or servicing  of their debt.
The lumping  together  of good  and bad debtors is repulsing  efforts of
countries that should  have  access to voluntary  lending.  The main actors
should  begin by abandoning  the concept  of a homogeneous  group of 15 or 17-2-
highly  indebted  countries.  The  contagion  effect  should  not  deter  the
creditors  from  differentiating  between  countries  in  the  same  continent  that
have  managed  their  economies  well  and  are  close  to  creditworthiness  from  those
whose  economic  policies  and  management  are  of questionable  quality. The  next
logical  step  is to  develop  a cooperative  framework  that  channels  money  through
equitable  burden  sharing  and  promotes  credit  enhancement,  debt  reduction,  and
other  innovative  financing  techniques  in  support  of  growth-oriented  adjustment
programs. The  alternative  is  continued  stagnation  in  the  highly  indebted
countries--which  could  mean  po.'itical  and  social  unrest,  a  greater  reluctance
to  maintain  orderly  debtor-creditor  relations,  and  a disruption  of  debt
servicing  even  in  countries  that  have  carried  out  their  obligations
unfailingly.
The Record
The net flows to highly indebted  countries  declined  precipitiously
from  an annual  average  of  $41  billion  during  1980-82  to  about  $8  billion  a
year  during  1986-88  (table  1).  1/  In  the  earlier  years,  private  lending
provided three-fourths  of resources  to these  countries.  In the recent  years,
official lending  and transfers  account  for the bulk  of the resources.  The
picture becomes bleaker  if net transfers  are examined.  From an aggregate  net
annual transfer of $16 billion  in 1980-82,  net transfers  started  to turn
negative in 1982  and accelerated  to an average  outflow  of about $29 billion a
1/  Aggregate  net flows  consist  of  net disbursements  of official
transfers,  direct  and equity  investment,  short-,  medium-,  and long-
term loans from  all sources  to the  private  and public  sectors  in a
country.  Net flows,  as defined  in the  World Debt  Tables and
elsewhere,  consist  only  of net disbursements  of short-,  medium-, and
long-term  loans  and exclude  other  components  of resource flows.- 3-
year in the  last  three  years.  2/
Table  1:
Highly  Indebted  Countries
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  1980-88
($  billion)
1980-82  1983-85  1986-88
(annual  average) (annual  average) (annual  average)
Official  transfers  0.4  0.8  1.4
Private  Direct  Investment  4.0  3.5  2.5
Official  lending  (net)  6.7  8.2  4.4
Bilateral  2.2  1.6  1.6
Multilateral  3.1  3.8  3.9
IMF  1.4  3.8  -1.1
Private  lending  (net)  30.1  7.3  -0.5
Aggregate  net  flows  41.2  19.8  7.8
Memo Item
Aggregate  Net  Transfers  15.9  -20.8  -29.0
Sources: World  Bank,  OECD  and  IMF.
Because  commercial  banks  accounted  for  most  of the  external  financing
to highly  indebted  countries,  the  dramatic  decline  in their  net  flows  from  $24
billion  in 1982  to  -$1.0  billion  in 1988  is  quite  revealing  (table  2).  In
1982  net  lending  by  these  banks  financed  almost  100  percent  of interest
payments  due  to them. By 1988  internally  generated  resources  of highly
indebted  countries  financed  100  percent  of interest  payments  and  even  a small
fraction  of amortization.  During  the  same  period,  the  domestic  savings  rate
2/  Aggregate  net  transfers  are  defined  as  aggregate  net flows  minus
interest  payments. This  concept  differs  from  net  transfers  that  is
used in  the  World  Debt  Tables  and  elsewhere  in  so far  as it  covers
both  debt-creating  as  well  as nondebt-creating  flows.- 4  -
of these 17 countries  remained  almost unchanged  at around 21 percent  of GDP,
shoving that  domestic savings  were financing  both domestic  investment  and
external outflows.
Table 2:
Highly  Indebted  Countries
Net Lending  by Commercial  Banks  _
($  billion)
1982  1985  1986  1987  1988
Disbursements  48.8  13.5  10.5  10.6  11.7
Principal  Repayments  21.0  12.3  12.6  10.0  12.6
Net lending  27.8  1.2  -2.1  0.6  -0.9
Interest payments  27.5  27.9  25.6  21.3  28.9
Net lending  as Z of
Interest  payments  101.1%  4.3%  -8.2Z  2.8%  -3.1%
1/  Public and Publicly  Guaranteed  (PPG)  Financial  Markets plus  Private
Non-Guaranteed  (PNG).
Source:  World Debt Tables,  1988,  The World Bank.
Nultilateral  institutions  are still the  major source  of positive  net
flows, but the volume  has shrunk  considerably  due to repayments  of large
borrowings from the  IMF during 1982-85  (table  3)  as the Fund's  resources  are
revolving  and for temporary  support  only.  The World Bank  has stepped  up its
adjustment lending,  and in 1985-88  it  was about the only identifiable  source
of net new funds  to these  countries,  with average  net disbursements  of $2.9
billion annually.  Net lending  by  multilateral  institutions  accounted for
about 29 percent  of interest  payments  in 1988,  much lower than the 326 percent
in 1982.-5-
Table 3:
Highly  Indebted  Countries
Net Lending  by Multilateral  Institutions  /a
($  billiori)
1982  1985  1986  1987  1988
jisbursements  7.7  8.9  10.7  10.2  10.8
Principal  Repayments  1.5  3.3  5.9  8.2  9.2
Net lending  6.2  5.6  4.8  2.0  1.6
Interest payments  1.9  3.7  4.8  5.6  5.5
Net lending  as X of
Interest  payments  326%  151%  100%  35.7%  29.1%
/a  PPC Multilateral  debt including  Use of IMF Credit.
Source:  World Debt Tables, 1988,  The  World Bank.
As the debt indicators  show,  most highly  indebted  countries  are no better
placed than when the debt crisis  erupted  six years  ago--signaling  the need to
depart from the present  approach.  The stock  of outstanding  debt grew one-
third during this  period,  and the  debt-GNP  ratio  and debt-export  ratio have
almost  doubled (table  4).  Total  debt servicing,  despite  repeated
reschedulings,  accounted  for  43 percent  of their  exports in 1988,  up from 37
percent in 1982.  The interest  to export  ratio  has eased  only marginally  and
only because  of rising  arrears.  The ratio of interest  payments  to exports in
1988  was still  as high as 26 percent,  despite the  highly indebted  countries'
expansion  of export  volumes  by almost 3 percent  a year for the last six
years.  So, despite  net resource  transfers  of 3 to 4 percent  of their  GDP to
creditors--by  compressing  imports  and generating  a trade surplus--the  highly
indebted  countries  could not reduce their  debt ratios,  and they have paid a
heavy price in forgone  economic growth.- 6  -
Table  4:
Highly Indebted  Countries
Debt Indicators
1980  1982  1985  1986  1987  1988
1.  Total External Debt (USS b)  289  391  454  482  527  512
2. Debt-GNP ratio  33  45  59  62  63  61
3. Debt-export  ratio  171  259  296  353  357  321
4. Debt-service  ratio /a  26  37  39  36  36  43
5. Interest-export  ratio /a  12  20  26  27  19  26
/a  These ratios  differ from those  reported  in the  World Debt Tables  as they
include  private  non-guaranteed  debt, short-term  debt and IMP charges.
Source:  Author calculations.
To sum up, the last six  years for the  highly indebted  countries  have
not been favorable.  Per capita  incomes  and real  wages have declined,
inflationary  pressures  have intensified,  net investment  rates ase abysmally
low, the debt burden  has ricen, and external  financing  flows  have turned
negative.  This setting  augurs  poorly for  a spe-dy,  sustained  recovery  by
these countries  in the near future.  The rest of this paper examines  the
external financing  needs of these  17 countries  for the next six years.  How
much do they  need to resume  modest  growth in their  per capita incomes?  And
what are the prospects  for,  and constraints  on, this financing?
External  Financing  Needs
Two scenarios  underlie the  estimates  here of the highly indebted
countries'  external financing  requirements  through  1995.  The scenarios  differ
in the assumptions  about the CDP growth  of the  highly indebted  countries'
trading  partners  and about developments  in interest  rates and the terms  of
trade.  The effect  of a slowdown  in industrial  countries'  growth in 1989-90
and higher  real interest  rates on the  external  financing  requirement is-7-
discussed,  but  no effort  is  made to  trace  the  effects  of a lesser  adjustment
effort  by the  highly  indebted  countries.  (The  underlying  assumption  is that
the  countries  that  are  not  prepared  to undertake  strong  adjustment  efforts  are
not  eligible  for  external  financing  support). This  scenario  may seem  to err
on the  pessimistic  side,  but  it is intended  to  provide  a possibly  higher  bound
measure  of the  external  financing  needed  to support  growth  it.  s
"stagflationary"  environment  similar  to that  of 1979-82. The  GDP  growth  rate
of the  highly  indebted  countries  is  projected  at 4.5  percent  for  1988-95--
ranging  from  5.5  percent  for  Brazil  and  the  Philippines  to  2 percent  for
Yugoslavia.
The  Base  Scenario
The projections  under  the  base  scenario  have  three  assumptions: (1)
continued  annual  growth  in  the  GDP  of the  highly  indebted  countries'  trading
partners  of 2.5  to 3 percent  to 1995,  enabling  annual  increases  in the  highly
indebted  countries'  export  volumes  of about  5  percent;  (2)  some  recovery  in
the  terms  of trade  from  the  historic  lows  of 1986  and  1987;  and  (3)  nominal
LIBORs  of  8.5  percent  until  1991,  then  gradually  falling  to 7 percent  in
1995. The aggregate  projections  are  comprised  of individual  countries  (given
the  common  external  environment  for  growth,  prices,  and interest  rates)  tuat
utilize  the  IBRD's  Revised  Minimum  Standard  Model  (RMSM). This  model  contains
a close  relationship  between  the  rate  of investment  within  an economy  and  the
rate  of growth  of output. This simple  specification  permits  the  use  of this
approach  across  countries. It is  widely  familiar  to individual  country
economists  and  is  the  central  tool  in  formulating  projections  in  the  WorldBank.  It  has the  disadvantage  of failing  to capture  other  (important)
elements  that  influence  growth,  but it  is judged  that  for  medium-term  analysis
the  robustness  is sufficiently  great  to  project  financing  requirements
required  to support  growth. Once the  investment  requirements  are identified
(through  incremental  capital-output  ratios)  and  the  domestic  savings
performance  are  specitied,  the  external  financing  requirement  is  obtained  as a
residual. In  most cases  an improvement  in  the  domestic  marginal  savings
effort  has  been  postulated  (presumed  to  occur  because  of policy  improvements
as adjustment  programs  proceed);  this  helps  to  avoid  a possible  overstatement
of the  external  financing  requit  went. The  country  projections  also  hinge  on
a fiscal  policy  correction  to realize  high  nmarginal  savings  rates  for  domestic
growth. Implicit  in  the  projections  is that  external  flows  are  required  to
finance  the investment  and imports  needed  for  a successful  export-led  growth
strategy. In all  of the  above  cases,  the  projections  are  based  on the
successful  implementation  of strong  adjustment  programs.
The improvements  in  export  performance  are striking,  with  the  debt-
to-export  ratio  falling  substantially  by 1995. The  dangers  to this  strategy
are  twofold. First,  the  domestic  adjustment  may be insufficient  to  redirect
the  required  resources  to the  export  and investment  sectors. Second,  the
external  financing  may  fall  short  of  what is  required. Later  in this  paper
the  likelihood  of the  external  financing  requireme.-  is  assessed  at some
length.
The required  net external  long-term  flows  (net  disbursements)  are
projected  to  rise sharply  from  $1 billion  in 1988  to  a range  between  $14  and- 9  -
17  billion  a year  during  1989-95  for  the  highly  indebted  countries  (table  5).
Table  5:
HICs  EXTERNAL  FINANCINC,  1982-95  - Base  Scenario
1982  1983-86  1987  1988  1989-91  1992-95
<---  ---- (Annual  averages  in $  billion)-------->
Current  account  deficit  51.3  8.7  7.9  8.2  16.0  17.0
Addition  to reserves  /a  -21.3  5.4  9.7  -5.5  4.0  6.0
Financing  requirement  30.0  14.1  17.6  2.7  20.0  23.0
Non  debt  creating  flows  /b  7.5  4.5  5.6  5.3  6.0  7.0
Net  LT flows  36.9  13.5  6.2  1.0  14.5  17,0
IBRD/IDA  1.9  2.9  2.3  1.5  3.0  1.5
Other  multilateral  4.1  4.3  1.1  1.6  1.0  1.0
Bilateral  2.0  1.3  1.9  2.1  1.5  1.5
Total  Official  8.0  8.5  5.3  5.2  5.5  4.0
Private  /c  28.9  5.1  0.9  -4.2  9.1  12.0
Short  term  flows  -16.6  -6.7  7.1  -3.7  -0.5  -1.0
Net IMF  2.2  2.8  -1.3  0.1  - -
Memo Item:
Net  flows  as percent  of interest  payments  to creditor
Official  245  166  51  62  58  46
Private  103  19  4  2  35  37
/a  Includes  Statistical  Discrepancy.
/b  Principally  foreign  investment  and  official  transfers.
/c  Includes  financing  via  arrears.
Source: Authors  own  calculations.
Given  the  identified  sources  of financing  from  the  official  sector,  the
expected  contribution  from  commercial  banks  required  to  cover  the  external
financing  requirement,  which  amounted  to  a net  outflow  of $4 billion  in 1988,- 10  -
amounts  to  $9 billion  a year  in 1989-91  and  $12  billion  a year  in 1992-95.
Lending  on such  a scale  from  commercial  sources  is fraught  with
uncertainty. It implies  a significant  increase  in  exposure  and  in  the
implicit  capitalization  of interest.3/  The implicit  interest  capitalization
was only  19  percent  in 1983-86;  and  net  flows  were  only  marginally  positive  in
1987.  4/  The  projections  imply  interest  capitalizations  of 35  percent  for
1989-91  and  37 percent  for  1992-95,  clearly  large.
The  external  payments  positions,  including  reserve  holdings,  of these
countries  differ  considerably,  as  does the  degree  of  macroeconomic  or
structural  adjustment  of their  economies. For  some  countries  (Chile,  Uruguay)
a  return  to  voluntary  access  to private  markets  is  within  grasp  if  adjustment
policies  are  sustained.  For  others  the  financing  requirements  from  the
commerical  banks  remain  high,  even  under  tough  adjustment  programs. For
another  group  of countries  exceptionally  high  net  flows  are  required  from  both
commercial  banks  and  official  creditors. And  a few  need  heavy  support  from
official  creditors.
An examination  of the  projections  for  individual  countries  (that
underlie  the  aggregate  projections  in table  5) show  that  the  17  highly
/3  A measure  of  net transfer,  implicit  interest  capitalization  is  the
ratio  of net  lending  by a creditor  (say,  private  banks)  to the
interest  payments  due  to it  in  any period.
/4  The  aggregate  figure  masks  large  differences.  Through  concerted
lending  packages,  generally  supported  by Fund  arrangements,  certain
countries  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile)  were  able  to  obtain  increases  in
commercial  bank  exposure,  but  others  suffered  a withdrawal  of
commercial  bank  lending.- 11  -
indebted  countries  can  be divided  roughly  into  three  categories.  Four
countries  that  account  for 10  percent  of total  highly  indebted  country  debt
require  external  financing  over  the  period  to 1995  that  is  modest  in  absolute
terms  or in  light  of recent  history;  for  these  few  countries  a strategy  of
growth-oriented  adjustment  based  mainly  on largely  voluntary  new-money
packages  is  unlikely  to  be constrained  by the  external  financing
availability.  Five  more  countries  account  for  35 percent  of total  highly
indebted  country  debt  that  is  large  in absolute  terms  or in light  of recent
history  and  require  external  financial  flows  from  official  or private  sources.
The final  category  has  holders  of over  half  of total  highly  indebted  country
debt.  They  face  a  heavy  financing  requirement,  in  all  cases  except  one  from
the  private  sector;  the  exception  is  the  Philippines,  which  has the  option  of
an officially  sponsored  "Marshall  Aid."
15.  For  several  highly  indebted  countriec,  especially  oknes  that  are  not
major  debtors,  the  limits  of the  debt  strategy  prevailing  in  1988  were  clear
to the  market,  making  it  extremely  difficult  to arrange  financing  packages.
When financing  packages  have  been  negotiated,  they  have  required  greatly
increased  participation  by official  creditors. For  several  of these  countries
prolonged  interest  arrears  have  become  a large  source  of financing  from
commercial  banks. The  forced  burden  sharing  by banks  in  new lending  has  meant
a shift  toward  a  unilateral  approach--hindering  other  (trade-related)  flows
and  rising  costs  and  uncertainties.- 12  -
The  Low  Scenario
Growth  in the  industrial  world  in 1988  and  thus  far  in 1989  has
exceeded  initial  forecasts,  with  the  United  States,  Germany,  and  Japan in
particular  experiencing  a strong  rise  in  domestic  demand. But  there  is some
risk  of  a marked  slowdown  in 1990  and  1991,  to less  than  the  2.75  percent  of
GDP  growth  assumption. Such  a temporary  slowdown  would,  besides  lowering  the
demand  for  imports  from  the  highly  indebted  countries,  mean  less  improvement
in  the  highly  indebted  countries  terms  of trade  than  that  projected  in the
base  scenario. This slowdown  is triggered  by  an officially  induced  U:se  in
nominal  and  real  interest  rates  of two  percentage  points  compared  to base  case
projections  on the  assumption  that,  as in  early  1989,  authorities  react  to
accelerated  inflation. This  rise  in interest  rates  would  not  only  raise  the
cost  of the  highly  indebted  countries'  floating  rate  debt.  It  would  also--
through  reduced  inventories  and  a fall-off  in  domestic  demand  in industrial
countries--dampen  the  highly  indebted  countries'  growth  and  tend  to soften
their  terms  of trade. In  the  simulations  in table  6 it is  assumed  that  growth
in  highly  indebted  countries'  export  volumes  is  dampened  by two  percentage
points  in 1989  and  one  percentage  point  in  1990  and  that  their  terms  of trade
worsen  by two  percentage  points  in  1989-90. These  adverse  shocks  are
temporary,  recovering  to the  parameters  in  the  base scenario  in 1992.- 13  -
Table  6:
Deterioration  in  highly  indebted  countries  external  financing  1989-95
caused  by a weaker  external  environment
1989-91  1992-95
(Annual  averages  in  $  billions)
Change  in  current  account  balance  (-  =weakening)  -12  -8
Change  in  net  flows  (+  =  increase)  8  6
Official  2  2
Private  6  4
Memo  Items:
Total  net  flows  as percent  of interest  payments  to  creditora
Official  75  66
Private  55  66
Source: Author's  own  calculations.
This scenario  shows  how  much  the  financing  requirements  of the  highly
indebted  countries  would  increase. The  net  annual  flaws  required  rise  to $30
billion  for  1989-91  and  $24  billion  for 1992-95  (tables  5  and  6).  Even  on the
assumptions  that  the  multilateral  and  official  lenders  step  up their  lending,
that  the  IBRD  lends  amounts  equivalent  to the  maximum  exposure  permitted,  and
that  other  official  lenders  greatly  raise  the  amounts  extended  over  the  base
case,  the  contributions  of the  private  sector  would  have to  be greatly
enlarged. The  required  net  flows  between  1989  and  1995  would  amount  to  high
rates  of interest  capitalization  by banks. In  light  of  both  recent  history
and the  current  lending  attitudes  of the  commercial  banks,  such  financing  are
large.
None  of the  17  highly  indebted  countries  is likely  to obtain  the- 14  -
additional  external  financing  required  if  there  is  a 1989-90  recession.
Brazil's  new  money  requirements  would  increase  by $3.5  billion  a year  during
1989-91,  with interest  capitalization  of  more than  50 percent  overall  and
about  80  percent  from  private  sources. Chile  would  require  commercial-bank
interest  capitalization  of about  70  percent. Mexico  is  perhaps  a little  more
robust  but its  commercial-bank  interest  capitalization  would  still  be about  40
percent. Morocco  and  Nigeria  would  need  extremely  heavy  "new  money"  support
in 1989-91.
PROSPECTS  FOR  FINANCING
Private  Direct  Investment
Private  direct  investment  flows  to the  highly  indebted  countries  have
been  slowing  significantly  since  the  beginning  of the  decade. But  because  of
higher  growth,  better  po;lcies,  an improved  investment  climate,  and  the
sometimes  strong  incentives  of debt-equity  conversion  programs,  this  trend  may
be reversed. These  flows  could  recover  strongly  if countries  implement
programs  that improve  incentives  to the  private  sector,  liberalize  trade  and
investment  regimes,  privatize  public  activities  and  reform  and  develop
financial  markets. Such  reforms  are  central  to the  objectives  of  World  Bank
assistance,  and  the  expansion  of this  assistance  beyond  levels  currently
planned  can  have  favorable  effects  on the  flow  of private  equity  capital  as
well. At a minimum,  it  would  seem  reasonable  to  expect  net  direct  investment
flows  of $4-5  billion  a year (including  debt-equity  conversions)  over  the  next
few  years. The  same  policy  measures--with  higher  growth  rates  and  specific- 15  -
steps  to encourage  capital  repatriation--should  also facilitate  a return  of
residents'  hcldings  abroad,  or at least  reduce  the  capital  outflow  from  these
countries,  now  about  $9  billion  a year.
Net  Official  Transfers
Net  oiZicial  transfers  (including  bilateral  aid)  to the  highly
indebted  countries  have  averaged  $1-2  billion  a year  and  seem  likely  to be
sustained  at this  level. Except  for  Bolivia  (and  perhaps  Nigeria,  Jamaica,
Philippines  and  Costa  Rica)  there  is  little  possibility  that  official  aid
flows  to the  17  highly  indebted  countries  as a group  will  be stepped  up.  The
continuing  budget  deficits  in industrial  countries,  the  growing  attention  to
Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  and  the  relatively  high  level  of per  capita
income  in  HICs  make it  difficult  to  expect  any  significant  change  in the
attitude  of official  donors.
Bilateral  lending
Bilateral  net  lending  to the  highly  indebted  countries,  including
export  credits  and  mixed  credits,  has  also  averaged  about  $2 billion  a year.
Although  there  will  be some  variation  in  the  availability  of these  credits,
depending  on the  country  situation  and  the  political  and strategic
attractiveness  to  creditor  governments,  the  aggregate  sums  are  unlikely  to be
substantially  higher  than  before. The  net flows  from  export  credit  agencies
have  been  disappointing  in recent  years--reflecting  their  difficult  financial
situations  and  the  decline  in  borrowing  countries'  demand  for  imported  capital- 16  -
goods  and  other  imports. Net  new lending  from  these  agencies  has  picked  up
somewhat,  but  more  net  flows  from  them  in  the  next  few  years  will  be needed,
as  well  as further  financial  relief  through  rescheduling  and  refinancing  of
interest.  5/
The  exception  to  this  pattern  is  Japan,  which  has  been  playing  a
prominent  role.  The  recent  actions  by Japan's  EXIM  Bank  to  make large  sums  of
untied  funds  available  suggest  the  way in  which  the  lending  policies  of export
credit  agencies  should  be adapted  to suit  the  highly  indebted  countries'
special  circumstances.  A combination  of some  increase  in  Official  Development
Assistance  (ODA)  and  untied  loans  by the  EXIM  Bank  of  Japan  may  boost  Japan's
net  lending  to  the  highly  indebted  countries  as  much  as $1 billion  a year in
the  near  term. But  the  reallocation  of  concessional  lending  to Sub-Saharan
Africa  and  export  credits  to  more  creditworthy  countries  in  Asia  by other
bilateral  creditors  may  offset  some  of these  gains. It is  therefore  safe  to
assume  an  annual  net  inflow  of $1.5  billion  from  bilateral  sources.
Multilateral  Lending
During  1986-88,  the  share  of the  World  Bank  and  the  other
multilateral  development  banks  (MDBs)  was  50 percent  of total  medium-  and
long-term  flows,  up from  roughly  12  percent  in  1980-82. If adjustment
programs  and  economic  performance  develop  as assumed,  net  flows  from  the  IBRD
/5  Some  $61  billion  in  debt  relief  was  provided  by Paris  Club  members  to
developing  countries  during  1983-87,  compared  with  only  $19  billion
in  1976-82.- 17  -
to the  highly  indebted  countries  can  be expected  to be about  $3  billion  a year
over  the  next  five  years. A further  $1 billion  in  net  flows  is likely  to be
available  to these  countries  from  the  other  Multilateral  Development  B=nks
(MDBs)  at  a minimum.
Commercial  Banks
Commercial  banks  continue  to  lend  to a  handful  of creditworthy
borrowers  (mainly  in  Asia),  and some  concerted  loans  are  still  arranged  for
such  highly  indebted  countries  as Brazil  and  Mexico. But  loan  charge-offs,
debt  conversions,  swaps,  buybacks,  and sales  have  all  contributed  to  the
declining  bank  claims  on highly  indebted  countries. An estimated  $12.3
billion  of commercial  bank  debt  was taken  off  the  books  in  the  first  half  of
1988  alone,  and  the  process  is  gaining  momentum. This  outcome  is a  major
ground  for  pessimism  about  securing  adequate  net  flows  from  commercial
banks. It is  not likely  that  the  commercial  banks'  attitudes  toward  the
indebted  countries  will  be reversed  soon. True,  there  will  be reschedulings
of principal,  reduction  in  spreads  and  fees,  and  some  concerted  new-money
packages,  mainly  to finance  retroactive  interest  arrears.6/ But  no
significant  new  flows  for  balance-of-payments  support  are  likely  before  1995.
/6  Since  the  inception  of the  debt  crisis,  commercial  banks  have
restructured  about  $300  billion  in  outstanding  principal;  they  have
assembled  $40  billion  of new-money  packages  and  have  arranged  special
short-term  credit  lines  on the  order  of $36  billion. The  figures  for
new  financing  from  commercial  sources  in individual  country
situations  through  new-money  packages  do  not take  account  of the
outflows  to  commercial  creditors  in some  countries.  Hence,  the  total
new  money  that  must  be raised  in  the  market  could  be somewhat  larger
than  the  aggregate  net  financing  requirements.- 18  -
Constraints  on Action
Debtor  Adjustment  Efforts
The  highly  indebted  countries  and  their  creditors  disagree  about  the
nature,  extent,  and  outcome  of adjustment  efforts. Most creditors  believe
that  the  economic  plight  of the  highly  indebted  countries  has  much to  do with
their  weak  commitment  to  reforms  and  with their  policy  slippages. The  highly
indebted  countries  have found  it  easier  to  cut  investment  than  to tax  or
reduce  the  consumption  of powerful  high-income  groups. The stop-go  cycle  of
economic  policies  has  also  eroded  the  credibility  of  adjustment  policies. But
political  leaders  of the  debtor  countries,  particularly  in  the  new
democracies,  argue  that  a decade  of continuous  decline  in  per  capita  income
and  consumption  has  generated  enormous  social  and  political  tensions  and
stretched  the  feasibility  of these  reforms  to the  maximum. Further  reforms  to
pay  off  their  debts  to foreigners--reforms  that  impose  even  greater  sacrifice
on the  population--will  pose  real  constraints.  Even  in the  best  of
circumstances,  structural  reforms  meet  formidable  political  obstacles  across
the  board.
The  political  problem  is  that  the  costs  of  adjustment  are  immediate
while  the  diffuse  benefits  materialize  only  gradually,  far  beyond  the  horizon
of political  leaders. George  Schultz,  when  U.S.  Secretary  of State,
observed: "If  the  immediate  visible  impact  of changes  in  economic  policy  is
hardship  at home  to  keep  up service  on the  debt,  then  that  debt  service  can- 19  -
have  the  effect  of a  marginal  tax  on economic  reform. Any effort  t￿xed at 100
percent,  or at only  excessively  high  rates  will  be diocouraged  and  become
politically  difficult  to sustain  (u.s.  Department  of State  (19881).
Is it feasible  to achieve  some  minimal  acceptable  growth  in output
and  consumption  and  simultaneously  improve  creditworthiness?  Most of the
highly  indebted  countries  cannot  restore  creditworthiness  or gain  access  to
capital  markets  even  with strong adjustment  policies. Moreover,  the  sharp
cuts  in investment,  maintenance  expenditure,  and  imported  inputs  disrupt  the
supply  responses  to better  relative  prices  and  make output  gains--normally
assumed  as a result  of successful  adjustment  program--difficult.  Another
problem  is that,  in  assuming  private-sector  debt,  governments  have  had  to
increase  their  budgetary  outlays  on interest  payments. Financing  the  growing
public  deficits  by internal  borrowing  or expansion  of  money  supply  has
exacerbated  the  inflationary  pressures,  generated  high  real  domestic  interest
rates,  and  added  to the  interest  bill.
External  Environment
The  ability  of highly  indebted  countries  to  grow  out  of debt  also
depends  on the  markets  for  their  main  export  products. The  major  debtors
increased  the  volume  of their  exports  substantially  since  1982,  but terms-of-
trade  Losses  eroded  the  dollar  gains. The  value  of  their  exports  in  nominal
terms  remains  unchanged--at  $150  billion  a year.
The  GDP  growth  rates  of the  C-7  countries  have  be￿'n  reasonably  high,- 20 -
but  the  spillover  to the  highly  indebted  countries  has  been  modest. The
situation  may  get  worse. Instead  of averaging  3  percent  or  more,  the  major
industrial  economies  are  expected  to grow  at 2.5  percent  annually  for  some
time. And if the  United  States  is serious  about  reducing  its  huge trade
deficit,  the  chances  of its  taking  a large  increase  in  exports  from  the  highly
indebted  countries  are  slim. Nor is it  obvious  that  Japan  and  Garmany,  always
reluctant  to stimulate  and  open  their  economies,  will  absorb  substantially
more  exports  from  the  highly  indebted  countries. Their  combined  GDP  exceeds
the  U.S.  GDP  by more  than  60 percent,  but  they  absorb  far  fewer  exports  of
manufactured  goods  from  Latin  America. Another  potent  threat  to  the  highly
indebted  countries  is  the  growing  market  share  of the  newly  industrializing
economies  in Asia.
The  price  prospects  of debtor  countries'  major  commodities  are  also
unpromising.  Real  prices  for  most  primary  commodities  will  remain  depressed
because  of structural  and  cyclical  demand  factors. And the  heavy  subsidies
the  industrial  countries  give  to their  relatively  high-cost  producers  will
continue  to depress  basic  food  prices.
Another  uncertainty  is the  movement  of real  interest  rates,  which
remain  high. Almost  two-thirds  of the  highly  indebted  countries'  debt is  tied
to  variable  interest  rates,  opening  them  to interest  rate  shocks. Every
percentage  point  rise  will  add $3.5  billion  to their  debt  servicing,  creating
larger  demand  for  new  capital  inflows  or  debt  reduction. The  policies  of the
United  States  and its  major  trading  partners  will  determine  the  interest  rate,
exchange  rates,  and  the  debt servicing  capacity  of the  highly  indebted- 21  -
countries. For  example,  a fall  of the  U.S.  dollar  could  ,  ive  interest  rates
way  up  and  push  the  U.S.  economy  into  a recession.
A combination  of slower  OECD  growth,  collapsing  commodity  prices,  and
rising  real  interest  rates  could  wreck  the  highly  indebted  countries'  economic
prospects.
Commercial  Finance
The  total  likely  to be available  from  all  known  and identified
sources  of finance--private  investment,  official  transfers,  bilateral,
multilateral,  and  export  credits--will  not  exceed  $6-7  billion  a year. The
financing  gap  during  1989-95  remains  about  $9-10  billion. Private  commercial
banks  traditionally  supplied  the  bulk  of financing  to the  highly  indebted
countries,  but  the  constraints  on their  lending  have intensified  in recent
years  for  five  reasons.
First,  skepticism  is  growing  about  the  near-term  prospects  for
improved  creditworthiness  in  the  debtor  countries. Bankets  know  that
restoring  creditworthiness  will be  a long  and  uneven  process. They  know,  too,
that  the  domestic  political  difficulties  of implementing  reform  programs
reduce  the  likelihood  of success. To make  matters  worse,  interest  arrears  are
increasing,  some  because  of unilateral  moratoria  on  debt service  payments.
Second,  banks  face intensified  pressures,  both  regulatory  and
competitive,  to strengthen  their  balance  sheets. The  regulatory  authorities- 22  -
in  many industrial  countries  are  adopting  more  conservative  guidelines,
presenting  banks  with stricter  and  more  comprehensive  capital  requirements.
As a result,  they  are realigning  their  strategies  to strengthen  their  capital
base,  restrain  asset  growth,  focus  on fee-based  activities,  cut  exposure  to
developing  countries,  and improve  profitability.
Third,  the  effect  of depressed  secondary  market  prices  for  developing
country  loans  has  damaged  the  share  prices  of banks  that  have  large
exposures. Prices  in the  secondary  market  suggest  a  reserve  level  of about  50
percent. If the  reserves  are  increased  that  high,  the  regulatory  capital
position  of the  U.S.  money-center  banks  will  get  worse,  probably  costing  them
substantial  losses. Moreover,  banks  face  the  prospect  of additional
provisioning  on  new lending,  making  participation  in  concerted  new  money
packages  expensive  and  at best  marginally  profitable.  Inter-country
differences  make  matters  worse. Even  though  the  loan-loss  provisions  by the
U.S. banks  appear  to  be in  line  with  other  major  banking  systems,  the  burden
and  risk  for  the  U.S.  banks  is  greater. They  have  a higher  concentration  of
lending  to  highly  indebted  countries  and  much  weaker  capitalization.  Banks  in
Japan  and  the  United  States,  unlike  their  European  counterparts,  receive  no
major  tax  benefits  for  creating  reserves. The  depreciation  of the  U.S.  dollar
has  also  reduced  the  relative  exposure  of  non-U.S.  banks  in  developing
countries.  The  reluctance  of  U.S.  money-center  banks  and  Japanese  banks  to
increase  their  exposure  to  highly  indebted  countries  is thus  understandable.
Fourth,  the  long-term  business  interests  of commercial  banks  are once
again  diverging. The  universal  (or  critical-mass)  participation  in concerted- 23  -
lending--the  modus  operandi  in  the  early  years  of the  debt  crisis--was  made
possible  by the  banks'  shared  interest  in  protecting  the  international
financial  system  and  in buying  time  to  reduce  exposures.  Except  for  the  large
international  banks,  this  phase  has  ended,  and  the  underlying  differences  in
exposures  and  business  strategies  are  determining  the  decisions  of  individual
banks  to  participate  in  lending  new  money. Many  regional  and  small-exposure
banks  are  redirecting  their  lending  to  traditional  domestic  and  trade
financing.  Even  among  the  larger  banks,  there  are  differences  in financial
interests  and  objectives.  Those  with  multinational  corporate  clients--and,  in
some  cases,  with  significant  domestic  banking  operations  in  developing
countries--can  be  expected  to  maintain  direct  interest  in improving  the
liquidity  of specific  debtor  countries.  But  other  banks  are  trying  to leave
the  debt-restructuring  process,  even  at the  cost  of significant  write-downs.
Fifth,  sustaining  the  concerted  new-money  process  will  require
adaptations  and  new  approaches  whose  success  is  as  yet  uncertain.
Restructuring  agreements  have  consolidated  most  of  (formerly  independent)  debt
obligations  and  established  a uniform  legal  standing  for  all  commercial
creditors'  claims. The  sharing  clauses  in  these  agreements  make  it  possible,
however,  for  some  creditors  to  collect  full  interest  due  on  their  outstanding
claims  without  contributing  to  the  fresh-money  loans  that  help  provide  the
resources  to  pay  that  interest.  This  free  rider  (or  recalcitrant  bank)
problem  has  become  much  greater  as the  new-money  participation  rates  fall./7
/7  In  Colombia,  for  instance,  only  112  of  about  175  creditor  banks
participated  in  the  January  1988  new-morney  facility,  which  had  to  be
reduced  to complete  the  deal.- 24 -
As a  result,  the  ability  and  willingness  of the  larger  banks  to continue  to
lend is  subject  to additional  stress. Exit  instruments  thus  far  have  not
sustained  the  burden  sharing  concept  that  was  part  of the  original
restructuring,  for  reasons  that  have perhaps  less  to  do with  the  design  of the
instrument  than  with  the  extremel/  complex  legal  issuea  surrounding  attempts
to  close  off  the  free-rider  opportunity.
It  will thus  be extremely  difficult--perhaps  impossible--to  generate
aggregate  net flows  for  the  highly  indebted  countries  in the  needed  amounts
exclusively  through  the  concerted  new-money  approach. Banks  still  hold about
two-thirds  of total  medium-  and  long-term  claims  on the  highly  indebted
countries,  but  the  pressures  not  to lend  will  grow,  forcing  selectivity  and
strong  reluctance  to  accept  exposure  increases  that  in  other  circumstances
might  look  reasonable  (2  to 3 percent  on average,  roughly  a quarter  to a third
of interest  due). The  number  of banks  participating  in  new-money  packages  is
likely  to  narrow  further,  as is  the  number  of countries  for  which  such
financing  can  be arranged. Banks  will likely  concentrate  any  new  exposure  on
countries  where  their  financial  and  long-term  business  interests  are
substantial  and  where  the  prospects  for  a successful  workout  are  reasonably
good.  Smaller  countries,  particularly  those  with  weak  adjustment  programs,
will continue  to find  it  difficult  to arrange  concerted  surport  (though  not
necessarily  continued  restructurings  of principal).- 25 -
SCOPE  FOR  ACTION
The  constraints  to  mobilizing  adequate  flows  of new  money,  especially
from  the  commercial  banks,  are  likely  to  remain  stron,. Part  of the  reason
for  this  is that  when  a systemic  payments  problem  arises,  markets  tend  to
experience  "revulsion,"  and  credit  volumes  become  paralyzed  by a neighborhood
problem--good  and  bad  debtors  are  lumped  together  (Eichengreen  1989).
Colombia  has  not  had  a debt  problem  as such  in  the  1980s,  but its  efforts  to
secure  truly  voluntary  syndicated  loans  has  nevertheless  been  severely
frustrated.
If  the  net flows  from  commercial  banks  are  unlikely  to rise
significantly,  what  other  means  would  meet the  financing  requirements  of this
group  of  countries? There  is  no clear-cut  or simple  answer. Needless  to say,
the  debtor  countries  themselves  have  to continue  taking  primary  responsibility
for  their  fate  through  further  adjustment,  however  painful  and  politically
difficult  it  may  be in the  short  term. The  more  flexible  and  responsive  their
economies  are,  the  more resilient  they  become  in facing  unexpected  economic
shocks  and  in improving  their  creditwort%iness.  Favorable  economic  policies
and  good  economic  management  will  attract  both  new  project  and trade
financing,  multilateral  lending,  export  credits,  and  direct  equity
investment.  So,  sound  policies  are  essential  for  capital  inflows  anl for
other  alternative  financing. The  other  possible  means  for  filling  the
financing  gaps  include  reduction  in the  stock  of  debt  or debt  servicing
followed  by reflows  of flight  capital. And in  cases  where  the  debt reduction
achieved  is  not  sufficient  to fill  in the  gap  and  the  country  is pursuing- 26  -
sound  adjustment  policies,  consensual  or sanctioned  accumulation  of interest
arrears  could  supplement.
Debt  Reduction
Why  is debt  reduction  then  a preferred  option  for  the  highly  indebted
countries  to fill  in their  external  financing  requirements  in pursuit  of a
reasonable  level  of  growth? The  net  negative  transfers  have lowered  the
investment  ratios,  which  have  reduced  output  growth  and  exports  and in  turn
their  capacity  to fully  service  their  debt. The  reversal  of the  net  negative
transfers  can  be  achieved  by increasing  new flows  of  money  but  as we have
examined  earlier  Lhe  probability  of new  money  flows  to highly  indebted
countries  in  the  next five  years  or so,  especially  from  the  commercial  banks,
is  very  limited. The  other  option  is  to reduce  debt  or debt  servicing. The
general  argument  in favor  of debt  reduction  rather  than  new  money  is  that  many
debtor  countries  have  been  unable  to return  to  growth  in the  presence  of very
large  debts. One  reason  for  the  persistence  of slow  growth  is  that  debt
overhang  acts  as a tax  on increases  in  current  and  future  income. If for
example,  a country  is  able to increase  its  exports  as a result  of policy
reforms  or more  investment,  a large  share  of the  benefits  is likely  to accrue
to creditors  rather  than  to the  country  itself. This  will  depress  the  returns
to the  country  from  fixed  capital  investment  and  thereby  weaken  the  incentive
to invest  even  if finance  is  available. By  reducing  the  creditors'  share  of
the  benefits  from  the  adoption  of adjustment  policies  and by  reducing  the
uncertainty  surrounding  the  sustainability  of adjustment,  debt  reduction
encourages  investment  and the  incentive  to implement  better  policies  which,  in- 27 -
turn,  boost  exports  and  debt  servicing  capacity. In this  case,  debt  reduction
could  make  both  debtors  and  creditors  better  off.
The IMF  (1989)  has  found  supporting  empirical  evidence  for  the  debt-
overhang  hypothesis. When  external  financial  flows  dried  up after  1981,
debtors  were forced  to run  trade  surpluses  in order  to service  their  debt.
Adjustment  in the  trade  balance  can  be achieved  by reducing  the  consumption-
output  ratio  or the  investment-output  ratio. In the  highly  indebted
countries,  the  consumption-output  ratio  has  not  only failed  to decline  in
proportion  to the  investment-output  ratio  but  has  actually  risen  on  average
between  1982-87.
The second  piece  of evidence  to the  existence  of these  disincentives
is  the  contrast  in  the  behavior  of investment-output  ratio  between  groups  of
countries  with  and  without  recent  debt-servicing  problems. For  countries  with
debt-servicing  problems,  the  average  investment  ratio  fell  from  about  25
percent  in 1980-81  to about  18.5  percent  in 1987. By contrast,  the  group  of
countries  without  debt-servicing  problems  experienced  very  little  change  in
its  investment-output  ratio,  from  about  28  percent  in 1980-81  to  27.25  percent
in  1987.
A third  indication  of this  phenomenon  is  provided  by changes  in the
composition  of investment  in the  indebted  countries. If  debt service  depends
on  overall  macroeconomic  performance,  disincentives  should  apply  to both  the
private  and  public  sectors. Empirical  estimates  of disaggregated  behavior  of
investment  in  a sample  of debt-problem  countries  show  that  both  public  and- 28 -
private  investment  ratios  drop  from  1981  to 1984.
The  cumulative  thrust  of the  evidence  reviewed  in the  IMF  study,  that
is the  behavior  of the  consumption-output  ratio  in  the  debt  problem  countries,
the  contrast  between  the  investment-ontput  ratio  in  these  countries  and  in
countries  without  debt  problems,  and  the  sectoral  evolution  of investment
between  the  public  and private  sectors  are  all  broadly  consistent  with  the
presence  of debt-overhang  disincentives.
Debt-reduction  measures  can  be  divided  in  several  categories: (a)
exchange  of foreign  debt  against  domestic  asset  (debt-equity  conversion);  (b)
exchange  of foreign  debt  against  another  foreign  asset  at a discount;  (c)  debt
buybacks,  and (d)  debt-servicing  reduction  through  reduced  interest  rates.
In the  first  approach,  the  original  lender  (or  another  party)  has
bought  the  debt  at a  discount  on a secondary  market,  takes  a loan  to  the
country,  and  obtains  in  exchange  local  currency  for  the  full  face  value  of the
official  exchange  rate. This local  currency  is  used  for  purchase  of local
equity,  relending,  and  so  on.  The  advantage  for  lenders  is that  they  find  a
use  for  their  loans  at a face  value  while  the  advantage  to the  borrower  is
reduced  debt.  But  if the  assets  acquired  by the  creditor  are  private  and  the
debt  is  held  by the  government,  which  is the  case in  most  highly  indebted
countries,  this  type  of conversion  contributes  to  accelerating  inflation  and
higher  real  interest  rates  if the  government  is  already  facing  fiscal
deficits. In that  case,  to redeem  the  foreign  debt,  the  government  increases
its  internal  borrowing  or  prints  money.- 29 -
The  exchange  of debt  for  other  debt  instruments  at a discount  such  as
bonds  and  exit  bonds  require  that  the  new instrument  is  a more secured  asset,
and  the  probability  of the  borrower  fully  servicing  this  asset  is  larger  than
the  old  debt.  This  usually  requires  that  the  new  asset  is  backed  by
collateral  for the  principal  or  a guarantee  for  interest  or both.  To purchase
the  collateral  the  country  must  have  excess  reserves  that  it  can  use  or
borrow,  or obtain  the  resources  from  other  sources. In the  Mexican  deal,
although  Mexico  provided  collateral  for  the  ultimate  repayment  of principai
(zero  coupon  U.S.  bonds  it  had  bought  for  cash)  the  outcome  was  disappointing
since  the  additional  value  placed  by creditors  on the  new  instrument  did  not
exceed  the  present  value  of the  collateral.
In the  third  type  of operation,  a country  buys  back  its  debt  at  a
discount  for  cash. Bolivia  and  Chile  are  two  such  examples. Countries  in
debt  difficulties  rarely  have  much cash  lying  about: the  Bolivian  operation
had to  be financed  by aid  agencies. Chile  was  able  to accumulate  some
reserves  in the  Copper  Stabilization  Fund  due  to unanticipated  increases  in
price  of copper. In  both  cases,  there  were  exceptional  circumstances  that
facilitated  the  debt  buybacks. In the  literature,  pursuasive  arguments
support  this.
The  fourth  type  of debt  reduction,  that  is  reduced  interest  rates  on
exisiting  debt  instruments,  has  not  so far  been  put  into  practice. The
reduced  interest  rate  option  is  attractive  from  the  debtors'  viewpoint  as they
receive  a substantial  relief  in  cash  flow. As the  reduced  interest  rate  is-30  -
tied  to  economic  performance,  the  fear  of  moral  hazard  is  also,  to  a large
extent,  neutralized.  A case-by-case  approach  to interest  rate  reduction
-.. 3otiated  in  the  framework  of an agreed  structural  adjustment  program  can
make a significant  dent  if the  accounting  and  tax  rules  are  modified  to
strengthen  the  incentives  for  the  commercial  banks.
The  present  tax  and  accounting  rules  do  not provide  any  incentive  for
the  banks  to  agree  to reduction  in interest  rates. A variant  of reduced
interest  rates  that  is  attractive  is  analogous  to equity  warrant  attached  to
bond  issues. if  the  country's  major  export  commodities  register  an upward
swing  relative  to the  threshold,  the  creditors  participate  in the  gains
proportionately  and  the  interest  rate  reduction  granted  earlier  is  brought
closer  to the  market  rate  in  accordance  with the  coL.Ltry's  payment  capacity.
It  has  also  been  suggested  that  reflows  of flight  capital  the  highly
indebted  countries  can  also  fill  their  external  financing  gap.  Estimates  of
flight  capital  vary  greatly  but the  pool  may  be as large  as $300  billion
(Morgan  Guaranty  1988). The conditions  under  which  flight  capital  find  its
way  back  are  not  necessarily  conducive  to the  financial  stability  of the
country. Those  willing  to  bring  ba(k  their  flight  capital  require  higher  risk
premiums  which  result  in  high  economy-wide  real  interest  rates. They  choose
to keep  the  assets  in  a  highly  liquid  form  and  do not  always  invest  in  the
expansion  of productive  capacity. And at the  first  possible  indication  of
political  or  economic  uncertainty,  these  financial  assets  leave  the  shores  of
the  country,  accentuating  financial  destabilization.  While  foreign  debt is
guaranteed  by the  debtor's  government  and  thus  safe  from  default  risk,- 31 -
domestic  investments  by residents  face  expropriation  risk  (Khan  and  Haque
1985). This  gives  developing-country  residents  further  incentives  to place
their  funds  in  riskless  savings  accounts  abroad,  and  it  gives  foreigners  a
comparative  advantage  in  lending  for  domestic  investment.  If  this
expropriation  asymmetry  persists  and  uncertain  economic  policy  environment
persists  there  is little  hope  for  substantial  reflows  of flight  capital  in the
near term. Unless  the  country  is able  to eliminate  debt  overhang,  reduce
economic  uncertainty,  and stabilize  the  economic  environment  there  is  very
little  hope  for  significant  inflows  of flight  capital.
This  finally  leads  to  the  question  that  has  been  the  stumbling  block
for  the  success  of  voluntar,  debt  reduction,  that  is  free-riding  banks  that  do
not  wish to  participate  in  voluntary  debt  reduction  hoping  others  will.  These
banks  hold  out  expecting  that  the  value  of their  claims  will  be strengthened
and  pushed  back  to par  value  by the  exit  of other  creditors. The regulatory
authorities  can  play  an important  role in  this  regard  by treating  the
nonparticipants  differentially  and  harshly  compared  to  those  participating  in
the  debt  reduction. The  key  to the  future  direction  of debt  reduction
therefore  lies  in  the  way  the  sticks  and  carrots  are  allocated.
The  Brady  Initiative
The  Brady  Initiative,  announced  in  March  1989,  makes  a significant
departure  from  the  existing  debt  strategy  by allowing  the  use  of financial
resources  of the  International  Financial  Institutions  (IFIs),  that  is,  the
World  Bank  and the  IMF  in  support  of debt  and  debt-service  reduction  in- 32 -
countries  pursuing  stronL  adjustment  policies. Although  this  is  a step  in  the
right  direction,  the  voluntary  choice  given  to the  commercial  banks  for
participation  under  the  existing  ground  rules  and the  limited  resources  likely
to  be available  from  the  IFIs  have  raised  some  skepticism  as to  whether  the
size  of debt  reduction  would  be sufficient  to  offset  the  debt  overhang. The
voluntary  market-based  case-by-case  approach  is an  adequate  response  if the
tax,  regulatory,  and  accounting  rules  provide  incentives  to commercial  banks
for  participation  and  penalties  for  free-riders  or  nonparticipants.
The  existing  rules  and  precedents  were  set  to facilitate  new-money
flows. Debt  reduction,  beyond  a certain  limited  scale,  would  impose
additional  financial  costs  to the  commercial  banks. The  credit  enhancement  or
the  resources  for  debt  buybacks  provided  by IFIs  would  not  be sufficient  to
make  a significant  dent  in larger  debtor  countries. Thus  the  Brady  Initiative
may  be  able to  assist  the  smaller  countries,  but  it  appears  that  the
expectations  that  have  been  aroused  about  its  impact  in the  larger  countries
are  at present  exaggerated.
Ishrat  Husain  is  Chief  of the  Debt  and  International  Finance  Division,  and
Saumya  Mitra  is  an economist  in the  Risk  Management  and  Financial  Policy
Department.  The findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  in  this  paper  are
the  personal  views  of the  authors. They should  not  be attributed  to the  World
Bank,  its  Board  of Directors,  its  management,  or  any  of its  member
countries. The  authors  are  grateful  to Don  Hanna  for  his  assistance  in the
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